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The “Vast Wasteland” Speech
Revisited
Jonathan Blake*
It is fascinating to reread the “Vast Wasteland” speech—Newt
Minow’s first major policy utterance as the “new frontiersman” assumed
the helm at the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or
“Commission”) over forty years ago. There are all sorts of themes from the
speech to write about: how remarkable it is that a talk delivered in 1961 by
an FCC Chairman should be recalled forty years later, let alone written
about; the limited space it in fact devoted to the “vast wasteland” theme;
and its cultural congruence with the Kennedy embrace of change in, and
challenge to, the existing order that toppled segregation, launched the
environmental movement, ultimately inspired the antiwar agitation, and
revolutionized dress, music, morals, and culture generally. (Newt Minow
may have had more in common with John Lennon than he realized.) Of
course, this era followed after the comfortable (for most) conformism of
Ike and the post-World War II era. I was tempted to write about these other
topics but decided to discuss what the speech did not address but
assumed—the framework of administrative law on which it was premised
and which has become so radically undermined in the ensuing decades.
What I was about to learn about administrative law was to be taught
to me by the redoubtable Professor Alex Bickel at Yale Law School. My
early experience practicing before the FCC a couple of years later
confirmed the administrative law principles that I had been taught. There
were bad decisions, to be sure, but there was a common understanding of

* Jonathan Blake is head of Covington & Burling’s Technology, Media and
Communications group. He has practiced communications law at Covington for thirty-five
years, is a former President of the Federal Communications Bar Association and has been
twice named one of America’s most influential lawyers by The National Law Journal.
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how administrative agencies were supposed to work, and one could
evaluate their performance (in fact the performance of all three parts of the
process—Congress and the courts, as well as the FCC) against this
common set of well-understood and, for the most part, well-accepted
principles.
Back then the conventional wisdom was that Congress enacted broad
principles and policy objectives; the agency used its expertise to flesh them
out in roughly equal measure via specific rulemakings and adjudications;
and the courts deferred to the agency’s implementation of these principles
and policy objectives, unless the agency’s decisions were adopted pursuant
to faulty procedures or were clearly wrong. Since then, a strong case can be
made that all three branches of government have deviated substantially
from their historic and intended roles and that this is as important a change
from the era of the wasteland speech as any of the topics it specifically
addressed.

CONGRESS
Both formally (in legislation) and increasingly informally (through
letters, meetings between staffs, and phone calls), Congress is taking
positions on very narrow communications issues which, under old
administrative law concepts, it should leave to the decision-making of the
expert agency, subject, of course, to Congress’s general oversight. This has
spawned the quite remarkable countertrend of the FCC leaving certain
decisions to Congress. A case in point is the FCC’s long reluctance to take
the steps necessary to implement the digital television transition, despite
direction from Congress in 1992 and 1996, and its relegation to Congress to
undertake the task of implementation. And because it understandably lacks
expertise as to the details, Congress can be less than clear in these
circumstances. Thus, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 generated the
rather odd outcome of two sets of Congressmen litigating in court against
each other over the meaning of the same provisions—provisions that they
themselves had enacted.1 This anecdote suggests that Congress tried to go
too far into the details and, as a result, passed a confusing statute, whereas
Congress should have adopted broad principles and left the specifics to the
FCC.
Further evidencing a weakening confidence in the administrative
agency process, Congress has also burdened the FCC with all sorts of
procedural requirements: analysis of the impact of its actions on small

1. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
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businesses; the Regulatory Flexibility Act;2 analysis of the time required by
private entities to comply with FCC requirements; clearance of new FCC
forms by the Office of Management and Budget; and the Sunshine Act,
which bars more than two commissioners from conferring privately on
issues. The latest congressionally imposed mechanism for policing the
agency is the Biennial Review process, which a three-judge panel recently
described in oral arguments as “absurd,” “ridiculous,” and “lacking in
sense.”3 Many, including Commission personnel, moan about the FCC’s
reversal record in court, but some responsibility may lie with Congress and,
as we shall see, with the courts themselves.

THE COURTS
Recent court decisions reviewing FCC actions reflect a mood toward
the agency process that might be described as sour. Even when not stated
expressly, a fair reading of various court opinions reveals frustration,
disillusionment, and confusion over how the administrative process is
working. Although the criticism is most often directed at the hapless
agency, Congress, as noted above, is sometimes its target. As with
Congress, there is a sense that the courts have lost confidence in the
process; the concept of the agency’s partnering with the other two branches
of the government (the FCC and Congress) to make the system succeed is
recognized in the breach.
Substantively, the courts’ interpretations of the First Amendment and
the Takings Clause4 of the Constitution have radically changed the legal
environment in which the FCC operates. The FCC’s freedom of action is
substantially cramped by these doctrines, which are far more constraining
than they were forty years ago. The “Vast Wasteland” speech
unselfconsciously, unashamedly, and without fear of the First Amendment
or other judicially enforced constraints assumes that the FCC can and
should oversee and regulate the quality of broadcasters’ programming. It is
in this respect, more than any other, that the speech seems outdated.

THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
It is hard not to have sympathy for the challenges that the FCC faces
today. In addition to the inevitable dulling of the original mandate of the

2. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601612 (2000)).
3. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (comments of Edwards, C.J.,
Ginsburg, J., and Sentelle, J., at Oral Arguments Tr. 11, 41, 44, 59), reh’g granted, 293 F.3d
537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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FCC over the past forty years (there is no dulling in Minow’s speech), there
are trends outside the FCC’s control, some already noted, that have made
its job far more difficult. The rapidity and radical consequences of
technological change, the expanding breadth of its jurisdiction, the
complexity of the issues, the sheer size and importance of the industries it
affects—all these pose enormous challenges for the FCC. The world of the
“Vast Wasteland” speech was far simpler.
Some of the FCC’s critics, noting these challenges and the
shortcomings of the administrative process, call for the FCC’s substantial
overhaul. It has lived through the Clinton-Gore Administration reinventing
government and the Republican-driven FCC restructuring of 2001. Neither
has had discernible impact on the success of the Commission or on how it
operates. Other, more radical, restructuring proposals have surfaced from
time to time, but they have promised too much, blinked realities, and/or
ignored the practical problems of implementation. Even the demise of the
FCC is urged by some—at a time when the rest of the world, moving
toward privatization of its communications industries in order to emulate
the United States’s successes, seeks to understand how to establish an
independent agency (like the FCC) to referee the disputes that their newly
privatized environment inevitably will generate.
But let us turn back to trends within the FCC’s administration of its
mandate that illustrate how things have changed in forty years and why the
administrative/legislative process that regulates the communications
industries is in trouble.

A SLAVISH DEVOTION TO RULEMAKING
AND BRIGHT-LINE TESTS
Justice Holmes said that law is the “triumph of experience over
logic.”5 But over the past four decades, the FCC has relied increasingly on
rulemaking and bright-line tests and has drastically cut back on hearings
and case-by-case determinations. In this agency, at least, a civil law
philosophy has come to control rather than the common law approach. This
trend may have contributed to the agency’s diminished credibility. Its claim
to expertise, which should help ward off invasion into specific areas by
Congress and should entitle it to judicial deference, was, in Professor
Bickel’s day, to be based in part on its experience in dealing with specific
cases. By relying so exclusively on rules, the Commission has deprived
itself of this experience. Newt Minow’s speech exhibits no presumption
that the FCC will adopt across-the-board rules to deal with poor

5. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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programming, the television community’s reliance on ratings, and
children’s programming—three of the topics he singled out in 1961.6
Interestingly, the Powell administration has embarked on a few
modest steps toward more case-by-case determinations. Its greater
emphasis on enforcement actions, which are fact-specific, is a case in point.
Another is the FCC’s willingness to consider in its omnibus multipleownership rulemaking a system of presumptive, rather than determinative,
guidelines that could be rebutted by showings based on particular
circumstances in individual cases. An additional example of a common law
approach to regulation is political broadcasting. The statute, particularly the
lowest-unit-charge principle,7 may be vague and flexible, but desirably so.
Implementing that law, the Commission staff has come to know the
broadcast and cable advertising industry and, through its handling of
complaints, keeps up with new developments. It has developed expertise of
the sort that lay at the heart of traditional administrative law forty years
ago. The FCC’s political-broadcast decisions may not always be right, but
they are informed and fact-specific, and by and large a very complex area
of law is well understood by those it affects: candidates, agencies, and
stations alike. (By contrast, the congressional debates on this subject are, to
be candid, ignorant and ill-informed.) The body of law that has developed
is at least as clear as rules adopted by the Commission in other regulatory
areas, and far more supple and adaptable.

A GREATER RELIANCE ON EXPERTS AND
A LESSER RELIANCE ON EXPERIENCE
A corollary is that the FCC today seems more enamored of big
theories than it used to be. Economists, who could learn something from
Holmes’s aphorism, play a much bigger role in Commission policymaking.
They tell the Commission how the markets should work, whereas the
Commission used to learn from individual cases how the markets, in fact,
worked. The decline in the number of engineers at the FCC, which this
Commission has tried hard to reverse, has meant a greater reliance on
engineering theory and less exposure to real-world engineering facts that
the FCC’s field bureaus, testing labs, and monitoring stations—all victims
of the federal budget axe—used to provide.

6. Newton N. Minow, Television and the Public Interest, Speech Before the National
Association of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1)(A) (2000).
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THE DECLINE IN PROCEDURES THAT PROVIDE
THE COMMISSION WITH CASE-BY-CASE EXPERIENCE
When Minow delivered his speech and for a decade or two thereafter,
oral arguments were a staple of Commission procedures. When ITT sought
to acquire ABC in the late 1960s, the FCC held two full days of oral
8
argument. The number of cases that were heard before the full
Commission and produced a record far exceeded the number that do so
today. To be sure, the Commission has adopted the mechanism of
congressional-style panels—the one on financial problems in the
9
telecommunications sector is a recent example. But by and large, these
panels are devoted to generic issues, often rulemakings. The FCC’s panel
on the AOL/Time Warner merger was one of few that were directed at a
10
specific transaction. The Commission no longer hears oral arguments on
decisions on appeal from the bureaus, and in the case of those appeals,
which are based solely on a written record, the bureau itself drafts the
recommended decision disposing of the appeal from its original decision.

THE ALLURE OF THE BIG SOLUTION
The doctrine of ascertainment was to end disputes between
community groups and television stations. The lowest-unit-charge
legislation was to satisfy politicians’ clamoring for lower advertising rates.
11
The eight-voice, top-four test was to bring rationality to duopoly law.
First lotteries, and then auctions, were intended to end controversy in the
licensing process. And now a spectrum-commons or spectrum-ownership
approach, or some combination of the two, is being touted as allocating
radio frequencies in calibration with the public need. (It should be noted,
however, that the proponents of spectrum reform have stressed the
desirability to begin with implementing their new theories on a limited
basis; for example, frequency band by frequency band.)
The philosophy of the common law is based on humility. We will
never get it right for all time; we always need the escape hatch and the
8. See Applications by ABC for Assignment of Licenses of Stations, Opinion and
Order on Petition for Reconsideration, 9 F.C.C.2d 546, para. 4, 10 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 289
(1967).
9. Restoring Financial Health to the Telecommunications Sector: En Banc Hearing on
Steps Toward Recovery in the Telecommunications Industry Before the FCC (Oct. 7, 2002),
transcript available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/enbanc/100702/tr021007.pdf (last visited Mar. 12,
2003).
10. Applications of America Online, Inc., and Time Warner, Inc. for Transfers of
Control, CS Dkt. No. 00-30: En Banc Hearing Before the FCC (July 27, 2000), transcript
available at http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/tr072700.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
11. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b).

BLAKE-FINAL

Number 3]

4/28/2003 10:46 AM

REVISITED

465

learning laboratory that individual cases give us. Even if government does
get it right for a moment in time, technology changes, social priorities
change, and markets change. There is no evidence that humility does not
continue to be a desirable ingredient in government decision-making. It
was not, however, a notable component of the “Vast Wasteland” speech.

OTHER TRENDS
Other developments since Minow’s speech might be cited: the rise in
the power of the staff prompted in part by the Sunshine Act; the trend of
relying on private, party-by-party lobbying to frame and illuminate the
issues; a reliance, generally, on draft “items” prepared by the bureaus to
launch commissioner involvement in substantive issues; the chairman’s
control over the agenda; the miniscule role of written pleadings in actual
Commission decision-making; and the prolixity of Commission rulemaking
notices. All of these and others might be examined to assess their effect on
the administrative process.

CONCLUSION
Comparing the self-assurance of Minow’s speech (some would say it
was too self-assured) with the tentativeness of today’s FCC, one is tempted
to urge a broader, deeper review of the administrative process. It may be no
accident that several of the agencies that existed in 1961—the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, to name two—
have been terminated or radically restructured. In any event, it has been
more than forty years since Judge Landis headed up the panel to review the
working of administrative agencies, and much longer since the
12
Administrative Procedure Act was passed. The scope of a new review of
administrative law should include the roles of Congress and the courts, as
well as those of the agencies. There might emerge a vision for how the
process should function—a vision that would be shared by the agencies,
Congress, and the courts, and then might be better understood by the public
as well. Otherwise, the administrative process that governs our critical
communications services is in danger of slipping, dare it be said, into a
“vast wasteland.”

12. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C. (2000)).
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